Open Access Copy-Please Do Not Cite Published in Journal of Strategic Studies 38(6): 777-800 "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." -Clausewitz, On War In this article, we evaluate Farrell's model, complemented with additional insights from the broader organizational change and military innovation literatures, against new archival material from the British counterinsurgency campaign in the Southern Cameroons . We argue that this small-scale war is a most-likely case for adaptation given existing theory: the British army has a strong reputation as a 'learning institution' and has been praised for the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency efforts in the twilight years of empire. The British forces in the Southern Cameroons, moreover, possessed all of Farrell's preconditions. Explanatory failure in such a most-likely case would call into question existing explanations, highlight important scope conditions, and provide fertile ground for generating new theoretical insights.
Posen argues that militaries are pathologically attached to the status quo, resisting change even when existing doctrines are clearly obsolete. Innovation thus requires civilian intervention. In 4 Winning the Next War, Stephen Rosen challenges Posen's top-down framework, arguing that the specialized knowledge needed to navigate enormously complex military organizations precludes civilians from imposing change from the outside. Rather, innovation is an inside-out phenomenon that starts within the military, provided that appropriate metrics and measures, effective feedback loops, and support from high-ranking internal advocates are in place. 5 This debate evolved to generate important insights on how biases, organizational culture, and bureaucratic structure foster or impede innovative behavior. Analyzing Soviet reactions to American doctrinal shifts in the Cold War, Kimberly Zisk finds that civilians and generals were equally prone to parochial interests. Elizabeth Kier argues that organizational culture led the 6 interwar French and German armies to adopt very different doctrines. Although both relied on short-term conscripts for manpower, French generals were culturally predisposed to dismiss conscripts as amateurs incapable of mastering mobile warfare and thus adopted a defensive doctrine. Lacking such a constraining belief, the Germans innovated blitzkrieg warfare. Deborah Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Cornell University Press 1994) . the retention of existing knowledge and thereby opening a broader space for new ideas; third, deploy in an organizationally decentralized manner, empowering soldiers on the ground to experiment; and, finally, exhibit high turnover in leadership, sparking change as the new leaders rotating into theatre are less wed to old practices and operating procedures. Farrell then 12 evaluates his model against the British military's experience in Helmand Province. He finds that the decentralized British army, with relatively poor institutional memory, successfully adopted population-centric COIN tactics after operational failures and when new units rotated into theater.
Farrell's work represents a significant step forward in understanding military adaptation and tactical learning. Nevertheless, it has several shortcomings. Perhaps most significantly, Farrell both develops and evaluates his model within the same empirical context; neither making the case study of the British in Helmand Province a valid test of his theory nor allowing us to evaluate the model's generalizability or scope conditions. Moreover, Farrell's conclusions within this single case study have come under dispute.
In a rejoinder piece, 'Getting COIN at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan,' Catignani disputes Farrell's choice of Task Force level data as evidence of adaptation. He argues that such data reflects the experiences of relatively high-ranking officers, who have strong incentives to demonstrate the purported achievement of tactical goals. Rather, by examining the experiences of lower ranking, front line leaders, Catignani reaches the opposite conclusion: instead of shifting tactics toward influencing the allegiances of the population, as Farrell claims, British units continued to focus on enemy-centric (i.e. kinetic) operations. Thus, despite possessing the Farrell, 'Improving in War, ideal enabling factors within Farrell's model, Catignani claims the British nonetheless failed to adapt. 13 The debate over military adaption is thus severely constrained by its current limitation to a single, disputed case study, which is further confined to one Afghan province. Comparative work is necessary both to further test Farrell's model and to probe the extent of its generalizability. By exploring the model's limits in new contexts, we may also generate new theoretical insights and improvements to the model itself.
Theoretical Framework: Preconditions for Adaptation
We begin by reviewing Farrell's military adaptation model and then grounding it further within the broader organizational change and military innovation literatures. We thus generate a 'most likely' model of military adaptation that fully incorporates Farrell's insights but also includes other important, existing theoretical knowledge. In addition to three of Farrell's preconditions (decentralization, leadership turnover, and poor organizational memory), we add two additional preconditions that, according to the organizational change literature, should make successful adaptation significantly more likely: feedback loops and supportive and flexible leadership. Finally, we modify Farrell's condition of prospective defeat. Rather, following findings in the military innovation literature that suggest defeat poorly predicts change, we adopt a more modest claim: that the identification of a known and clear adversary, regardless of the prospects for victory, makes adaptation easier.
Sergio Catignani, '"Getting COIN" at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Decentralization: First, Farrell claims that decentralization facilitates adaptation, mirroring a key finding in the broader business and economics literatures on organizational change. Delegating authority opens increasing space for creativity and experimentation in the field. The more front line leaders experiment, the more new ideas will emerge, supporting bottom-up learning. Importantly, it matters not whether decentralization is deliberate or the result of happenstance, as is often the case in counterinsurgencies when geography undermines centralized command and control. See David French, The British Way in Counterinsurgency, 1945 -1967 (Oxford University Press 2011 and to control a large swathe of territory. The British departed at the end of 1961 with an active insurgency in place, handing an insecure territory over to the new Cameroon Republic who, with French assistance, immediately began operations. This is thus also a deviant case, enabling us to use process-tracing techniques to potentially identify where and how the model diverged from the historical case and thereby suggest theoretical refinements. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960 -1970 and 2003 -2006 (RAND Corporation 2008 ; Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.
Background to the Intervention
The insurgency in the British Southern Cameroons had its roots in neighboring French colonial policy. Following World War I, trusteeship over German Kameroun had been divided between France and Britain, who each administered their territory independently. In 1948, a political organization advocating for rapid and total independence, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) was founded in the southern part of the French territory. In the aftermath of 
Preconditions for Adaptation in the Southern Cameroons
The British military in the Southern Cameroons exhibited all of the enabling factors that, according to existing theory, would maximize their potential to adapt in the field: they were organizationally decentralized, experienced leadership turnover, had poor organizational memory, possessed institutionalized feed back loops, were led by commanders who were supportive of operational changes, and faced a clear threat by a known adversary. comments suggests that British officers took these reports very seriously and not as a pro forma part of their job.
These measures of tactical effectiveness allowed commanders at every level to assess gaps in performance as well as to understand the unintended effects of their combat activitiesan especially important capability in counterinsurgency. For example, after-action reports, detainee interrogations, and Perintreps showed that assaults on rebel camps rarely achieved surprise, allowing insurgents to escape into the forest through pre-planned evasion routes. Commanders saw this as a key reason why they could not achieve surprise in raids or stop fleeing insurgents and repeatedly petitioned for the declaration of emergency. metrics to identify their own operational shortcomings, generate ideas for solutions, and communicate these ideas to decision-makers (in the War Office when necessary), why then did they fail to adapt to changing insurgent tactics and maintain control over their territory? We argue adaptation failed because it was never implemented. And it was never implemented because the military subordinated itself to the political ends of the government. In the best Clausewitzian tradition, war operated as an extension of politics and the greater strategic interests of the retrenching British Empire trumped local military effectiveness. 'This whole matter does raise the question as to exactly what is the aim as regards security generally in the territory. Is it just a matter of keeping our noses clean until 1 Oct or should there be the wider aim of looking much more to the future and doing what can be done in the way of stamping out all forms of subversive activity in the short time available. For example, the 75 terrorists who escaped from the SASSO camp will live to fight another day, which they might not have been able to do if a full scale operation with all available support could have been mounted on the camp.' As to the option advocated by local police and military forces, to change the legal framework and expand offensive operations, the War Office had this to say:
'We can only adopt this policy if we are prepared to reinforce the Southern Cameroons. We would then be placed in a position of principals in a repressive colonial war. Our present forces are unlikely to be able to achieve any significant success. Their action might lead to a widespread outbreak of terrorism and a situation beyond their control. Reinforcement would have to be planned. This would raise great administrative problems... and our withdrawal would almost certainly be delayed.'
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The War Office thus advised political leaders that adapting tactics to regain territorial control could have negative political consequences, both for Britain's international reputation and its Ibid. In his assessment, the Southern Cameroons Commissioner also made a strong case for inaction. Among other concerns, he warned that troop casualties might evoke a negative domestic reaction in the United Kingdom-that the public would not understand losing lives for a territory soon to be granted independence where Britain had no lingering national interest. He further argued that, 'In mounting such operations we would be doing no less than attacking Africans with white troops in an African territory two months before independence at a time when world opinion as been made brittle by events in the Congo, Angola, and elsewhere in Africa... Having regard to the condemnatory attitude adopted towards the British position over Angola and South Africa, Her Majesty's Government might find their interests further prejudiced by committing British troops to offensive action in the Southern Cameroons.' 67 Here, the Commissioner is arguing that offensive military action, particular if it is effective, would further deteriorate Britain's reputation in the region. Such a loss of reputation could have long-term political and strategic implications far more important than defeating a small insurgency in a soon to be independent colonial backwater.
This concern for Britain's broader strategic and political interests, both at home and abroad, thus comes to frame the request for change so strongly desired by front line military forces. In the end, the British government chose to halt military adaptation from below, wait out the remaining months of their colonial trusteeship, and hand over a partially insurgent-controlled and insecure territory to the Cameroon Republic. Decisions at the top-by Parliament and the War Office-thus prevented the implementation of military change.
Ibid.
The Counterfactual Claim: What if an Emergency had been Declared?
Of course, this argument that political imperatives blocked adaptation from below rests on the counterfactual claim that had British authorities declared an Emergency, and thereby allowed the military to pursue more aggressive counterinsurgency tactics, they would have prevailed (or at least performed better). Any such counterfactual claim over the outcome of war is difficult to establish. Insurgencies in general are highly complex and difficult to defeat. Many powerful armies have been bogged down for years conducting counterinsurgency operations and, eventually, withdrawn in defeat.
Y et, there are compelling reasons to think that, in this case, the British military would have emerged successful. First, emergency regulations legalized a extensive array of counterinsurgency and policing tactics not available otherwise, including the ability to establish free fire zones (prohibited areas), separate insurgents from the population through food control and the construction of secured villages, and criminalize and prosecute a wider variety of civilian offenses, including passive support of the rebels. Such tactics were used to great effect by 68 British forces-even by the same commanders that were later deployed to Cameroon-to quash contemporary insurgencies in both Kenya and Malaya, where Emergencies were declared.
Indeed, the rebellions in these colonies were far more organized, serious threats. In contrast to the estimated 1000-1200 insurgents in the Southern Cameroons (at their peak when British forces their front line subordinates, transmitting precise and relevant tactical measures of effectiveness, and filtering mountains of raw information into usable intelligence for commanders. As a result, commanders were able to effectively identify operational shortcomings.
That the British nonetheless failed to adapt is a poignant reminder that neither war nor change occur in a vacuum. Military organizations and the soldiers who lead them want to win.
History suggests they are willing to be extraordinarily dynamic and flexible in their pursuit of victory. Their political masters, however, may have other plans. States -especially great powers -face multiple goals and difficult tradeoffs. In their pursuit of broader objectives, political leaders may prioritize ends and means in ways that seems counterproductive when looking at one military mission in isolation. In this case, the Southern Cameroons was one of many missions for an already over-stretched army and state. We should not be surprised that British soldiers and officers on the ground were prepared to change, but were stymied by their civilian leaders. What might seem perverse at the tactical level was quite logical when put in a broader strategic perspective.
Insofar as our theory generalizes beyond the British in the Southern Cameroons, it creates new directions for future policy and scholarly work on military adaptation. In terms of academic research, our findings suggest that adaptation should be disaggregated into its constituent phases.
Each step along the path to learning exerts unique challenges on a military organization. We should not assume that the attributes and characteristics that help an organization navigate one stage will necessarily prove useful in the next. Neither recognizing failure nor identifying alternatives guarantees that adaptation will occur. By disaggregating the learning process we can discover a great deal more about how learning and adaptation unfold.
The case also highlights an interesting dichotomy. While adaptation is a bottom-up phenomenon by definition, its most important determinant-politics-operates from the topdown. The quest to identify adaptation's organizational sources should not lead us to ignore its contextual causes and impediments. Political considerations affect adaptation by setting and changing objectives, determining and shifting metrics, allocating and reallocating resources, privileging and devaluing certain career paths, and by prescribing and proscribing acceptable options.
In terms of policy, our findings warn against placing too much faith in learning organizations. To be sure, some military organizations lack adaptation's institutional prerequisites. These forces are therefore unlikely to adapt under any circumstances. Yet, even militaries primed to adapt still require a conducive political environment. Such a lesson is apt for American policymakers, especially because the U.S. military proved so adaptive in Iraq and Afghanistan. From tapping into a literal army of academics and consultants, to facilitating blogs and discussion groups for junior officers, to disseminating lessons learned on an almost 'real time' basis via the internet and cloud computing, American servicemen and women embraced change. Such an outcome should not lull policymakers and leaders into complacency. As the British Army discovered in the Southern Cameroons, even learning organizations can fail to adapt when winning incurs a higher political cost than losing.
